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Abstract
This paper aimed to explore and clarify the concept of behavioral flexibility. A selective literature review explored how the
concept of behavioral flexibility has been used in ways that range from acknowledging the fact that animals’ behavior is not
always bounded by instinctual constraints, to describing the variation between species in their capacity for innovative foraging, a
capacity that has repeatedly been linked to having a brain larger than would be predicted from body size. This wide range of
usages of a single term has led to some conceptual confusion.We sought to find a more precise meaning for behavioral flexibility
by representing it within a simple formal model of problem solving. The key to our model is to distinguish between an animal’s
state of knowledge about the world and its observable behavior, using a construct of response strength to represent that
underlying knowledge. We modelled behavioral flexibility as a parameter in the function that transforms response strengths into
observable response probabilities. We tested this model in simulations based on some recent experimental work on animal
problem solving. Initial results showed that parametric manipulation can mimic some of the behavioral effects that have been
attributed to flexibility.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper was to explore the concept of be-
havioral flexibility. The term is widely used: down to the end
of 2018, Web of Science records 1,867 publications that used
it in their title, abstract, or keywords, with 167 such references
in 2018 alone. While some of these publications are not rele-
vant to comparative cognition, many are. Unsurprisingly, giv-
en the extent to which the term is used, authors are not con-
sistent in what they mean by it. Accordingly, we do not start
this paper with a definition of behavioral flexibility. Instead,
we attempt to extract a core meaning for it within comparative
cognition, by tracing the way it has been used historically, and
by collating the consequences that have been associated, em-
pirically, with greater or lesser degrees of behavioral flexibil-
ity. We are not offering an exhaustive review of the literature
on behavioral flexibility, but rather attempting to identify its
key points by means of selected examples; inevitably, these
examples are biased towards areas of study, or study species,
in which we have personal experience; in particular, we con-
centrate on examples involving animals extracting food from
the environment. We then attempt to make the meaning of
flexibility more precise by formulating a simple model of
learning in problem-solving situations, in which flexibility is
commonly supposed to play a part. In this model we introduce
a parameter that aims to capture what we mean by flexibility.
Thus, we hope to end with a definition, rather than starting
with one. Simulations based on the model test the extent to
which we have indeed captured the essence of behavioral
flexibility; however, it is inevitable that any precise definition
will be inconsistent with some of the historical uses of the
concept.
Historical development of the concept
of behavioral flexibility within comparative
cognition
To understand the origins of the concept of behavioral flexi-
bility, we have to recall a conflict over the explanation of
animal behavior that now seems quaint. In the 1930s–1950s
there was a sharp distinction between two approaches. On the
one hand, comparative psychologists (mainly Anglo-Saxon)
were seeking to explain behavior in terms of the experiences
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of reward and punishment that an individual animal had had.
On the other hand, ethologists (mainly European) were seek-
ing to explain behavior in terms of the species to which an
animal belonged, and the evolutionary and developmental
history characteristic of that species. Of course, things were
much more nuanced than this crude summary implies. But
these polar positions illuminate the first significant use of the
term “behavioral flexibility” that we have been able to find in
the literature of what we would now call comparative cogni-
tion. Poirier (1969) introduces the term to cover the variations
in behavior he observed between and within troops of Niligri
langurs (Semnopithecus johnii) in the wild. In particular,
troops varied in their diet, and although these variations were
partly explained by variations in availability (in turn due to
variations in the intrusion of human activities into the mon-
keys’ home ranges), Poirier found that a full explanation re-
quired an appeal to learned traditions of food acceptability.
Within troops, younger animals and females were more ready
to accept new foods. Thus behavior – even species-typical
behavior – could not be accounted for by the kind of fixed-
action pattern that the early ethologists described (e.g.,
Lorenz, 1932/1970; Tinbergen & Perdeck, 1950), whose very
name implied inflexibility.
Fifty years after the publication of Poirier’s paper, all of this
seems completely obvious, and we certainly no longer think in
terms of a dichotomy between “innate” and “learned” behav-
iors. Poirier, however, found it necessary to devote most of the
Discussion of his results to the point that “much of primate
behavior results from a sizable learning component” and that
“animals do not live by innate behavior alone” (p. 130). In this
earliest, and still current, sense, therefore, “behavioral flexibil-
ity” simply encompasses all learning to adapt to the particular
conditions of an individual’s environment – in effect, the
whole of animal cognition.
Behavior is not always flexible
To say that behavior is flexible in this sense can seem like a
glimpse of the obvious. To make sense of it, we need to re-
member the extent to which the behavior of individual animals
is often inflexible – or is thought to be. Animals do not behave
at random, and if there is no reason to change their behavior,
we should not expect that they will do so. Some examples of
relative inflexibility include:
Individual foraging site fidelity Many animals live, roost, or
nest in colonies to which they return either after each day’s
foraging or (especially when incubating mates or young are
being fed) repeatedly during foraging. It is common for such
colonial central place foragers to be faithful to a particular
foraging site, even though they would be equally capable of
reaching, and using, the sites used by other colony members;
and even though these areas are not defended as a territory.
E.A. Morgan, Hassall, Redfern, Bevan, and Hamer (2019) list
a number of examples of such individual foraging site fidelity,
and explore its extent – and limitations – in the European shag
(Phalacrocorax aristotelis), a colonially nesting diving bird.
Across the 70 shags they studied, the overlap between the
utilization distributions of foraging sites on repeated trips var-
ied considerably, from 0.06 to 0.75 on a scale from 0 to 1; but
it was far higher than would be expected by chance.
Furthermore, such inflexibility may be advantageous: female
shags with a higher repeatability score tended to hatch their
eggs earlier and were in better body conditions than those with
lower scores. Obviously, since these preferred foraging sites
consisted of a patch of open sea, there was no question of
territorial defense.
Consistency of foraging method Even when attacking a par-
ticular kind of prey in a given location, animals may have
more than one method of attack available. In many coastal
sites in northern Europe, Eurasian oystercatchers
(Haematopus ostralegus) prey on the common mussel,
Mytilus edulis, especially where large beds of mussels are
found, as in the drowned estuaries of south-west England
and Brittany. Three distinct techniques that oystercatchers
use for opening mussels have been documented. One involves
stabbing at the opening between the valves of the shell. The
other two both involve hammering through the shell.
However, in one case the bird hammers through the dorsal
surface of the shell in situ, while in the other it removes the
mussel to an “anvil,” a nearby location where it will be held in
place while the oystercatcher strikes it, and hammers through
the ventral surface of the shell (Goss-Custard, Durell, & Ens,
1982; Norton-Griffiths, 1967). Goss-Custard et al. observed
28 individually marked oystercatchers; roughly equal num-
bers used each technique, and all but one of the birds used a
single technique exclusively. Another example of consistent
variation in foraging method has been described in humpback
whales: although humpbacks generally use bubbles to herd
fish prey, sometimes in complex ways, the details (for exam-
ple, whether or not bubble clouds are used) vary between
individuals and regions (Wiley et al., 2011).
Consistency of foraging parametersWithin a particular forag-
ing method, the parameters of the behavior may show consis-
tent individual differences. For example, air-breathing divers
face a trade-off between time available for foraging underwa-
ter and time available for replenishing oxygen stocks on the
surface; in general, we would expect the balance to be struck
at an underwater duration somewhat less than the maximum
physiologically possible (Kramer, 1988). Potier, Carpentier,
Grémillet, Leroy, and Lescroël (2015) examined the repeat-
ability of the parameters of diving behavior in the great cor-
morant (Phalacrocorax carbo), and found considerable vari-
ation in repeatability between individuals and between
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parameters; in general, however, repeatability was substantial-
ly greater than would be expected by chance. For some pa-
rameters (e.g., mean time underwater per dive) high repeat-
ability – inflexibility – was associated with reduced overall
foraging efficiency, a likely proxy for fitness. But for others
(e.g., mean time spent underwater per diving bout) the relation
was positive.
None of these examples is absolute. We have already seen
that there was individual variation in repeatability of behavior
in both the diving examples; and in the case of oystercatcher
foraging methods, subsequent work by Goss-Custard and col-
leagues showed that individuals tend to shift from stabbing to
hammering as they grow older (Goss-Custard & Sutherland,
1984), and that at each age, the predominant method is the one
associated with the higher fitness (Durell, Goss- Custard,
Caldow, Malcolm, & Osborn, 2001). But they do show that
flexibility is neither ubiquitous nor always advantageous.
Indeed, Davis, Schapiro, Lambeth, Wood, and Whiten
(2019) have argued that, because of overall limitations on
cognitive capacity, some degree of behavioral inflexibility
(or, as they term it, conservatism) is an inevitable result as
individual behaviors become more complex. In a series of
experiments on captive chimpanzees, they showed that there
was little conservatism (i.e., high flexibility) when chimpan-
zees were required to inhibit a simple well-established re-
sponse (using one of two available handles) to extract food
from a puzzle box. But the apes showed greater conservatism
when the apes had to inhibit a more complex, also well-
established response, involving two successive doors and re-
moving an obstacle in order to access food in a different puz-
zle box.
Flexibility as variation in behavior in response
to environmental change
It is, therefore, not unreasonable for ethologists to start from
an assumption of behavioral inflexibility: that an animal’s be-
havior can be predicted from what kind of animal it is.
Nevertheless, behavioral ecology has revealed many cases
where the behavior of a given species varies depending on
the environmental conditions, either between individuals liv-
ing in different environments, or within the lifetime of an
individual. Indeed, many of the optimizing models that have
been the theoretical bedrock of behavioral ecology predict that
such variation should occur. The following brief lists give a
few examples of situations where it has been demonstrated.
They are selected because their authors specifically referred to
behavioral variation as a function of environmental change as
“behavioral flexibility,” and they thus show the enduring use
of this terminology over a two-decade period.
In some cases, “behavioral flexibility” is used to describe
cases where behavior varies between populations living in
different environments, or between groups within the
population (e.g., between sexes or age classes). For example,
Price, Tonn, and Paszkowski (1991) demonstrated variations
in the prey choice, habitat use, and activity pattern between
males and females and between adults and juveniles in fathead
minnows (Pimephales promelas); Klett-Mingo, Pavoni, and
Gil (2016) found that vigilance in great tits (Parus major)
living near a major airport varies as a function of aircraft
noise; and Ben Cohen and Dor (2018) found that the explor-
atory behavior and neophobia of house sparrows (Passer
domesticus) varies along a climate gradient in the same way
as morphological characteristics such as size and the darkness
of the plumage.
In other cases, “behavioral flexibility” is used to describe
behavior change that we can be confident is occurring within
individuals, either because individuals have been tracked, or
because the changes affect whole populations as a function of
time of day or year. For example, Thompson and Baldassarre
(1991) showed that the activity patterns of several species of
migrant ducks in Yucatan change with foraging site and
temperature; Knight, Vanjaarsveld, and Mills (1992) observed
the unusual phenomenon of allo-suckling in spotted hyenas
(Crocuta crocuta) after a prolonged drought; Palagi,
Antonacci, and Cordoni (2007) showed how a play signal
could switch the response to an ambiguous behavior from
aggression to play in young lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla
gorilla); and Christensen-Dalsgaard, May, and Lorentsen
(2018) found that foraging site use in black-legged kittiwakes
(Rissa tridactyla) varies as a function of distance from nest
site, in interaction with weather conditions.
Flexibility mediated by learning and culture
in the wild
Where behavior differs between populations, the differences
could be mediated by genetic, instinctual mechanisms, and
indeed in some cases authors (e.g., Ben Cohen & Dor, 2018)
have sought to correlate behavioral and genetic variation.
Other authors, however, invoke the term “behavioral flexibil-
ity” to mark the fact that animals learn to adapt their behavior
to their varying environments. Such learning inevitably builds
on the characteristic behavioral repertoire of the species con-
cerned, and several general theories have been produced to
detail the interaction of evolutionary and cognitive processes
in bringing about adaptive behavioral variation. Examples in-
clude the theories of Bindra (1978), West-Eberhard (2003,
chapter 18), Mery and Burns (2010), and Fawcett, Hamblin,
and Giraldeau (2013) for behavior in general, and Taborsky
and Oliveira (2012) for social behavior in particular.
In looking for demonstrations of the role of learning in
adaptive phenotypic variation under natural conditions, we
face the difficulty of disentangling learning effects from those
of genetic variation. Furthermore, the mere occurrence of
learning is not sufficient, since learning is involved in the
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emergence of many behaviors that are typical of a species
(Hailman, 1969). What we are looking for are cases where
behavioral differences within a population (or within the life-
time of an individual) can be attributed to different learning
experiences. Despite the difficulties, learning has been
claimed as an explanation of natural behavioral flexibility
across a wide taxonomic range, including in the feeding of
gastropods (reviewed by Elliott & Susswein, 2002), in prey
capture by ladybird beetle larvae (Anisolemnia tetrastictas:
Dejean, Gibernau, Lauga, & Orivel, 2003) and jumping spi-
ders, especially Portia spp. (e.g., Jackson & Pollard, 1996,
and much subsequent work from this research group), in
nest-site selection by Indian house crows (Corvus splendens:
Yosef, Zduniak, Poliakov, & Fingerman, 2019), in the detec-
tion of water for drinking by barbastelle bats (Barbastella
barbastella; Russo, Cistrone, & Jones, 2012), in the use of
sponge tools by bottlenose dolphins (Krützen et al., 2005),
and indeed in the variation of foraging behavior of Niligri
langurs, as in the earliest use of the term “behavioral flexibil-
ity” that we have found (Poirier, 1969).
Problem-solving capacity as behavioral flexibility
For many authors, the capacity for learning alone does not
encompass what they mean by behavioral flexibility. A pop-
ular alternative, which has been used across a range of verte-
brate taxa, is the capacity for learning the reversal of a task that
has been well trained. Among those who have used reversal
learning as an index of behavioral flexibility are Pintor,
McGhee, Roche, and Bell (2014) studying Northern pike
(Esox lucius); Petrazzini, Bisazza, Agrillo, and Lucon-
Xiccato (2017) studying sex difference in the cognition of
guppies (Poecilia reticulata); Szabo, Noble, Byrne, Tait, and
Whiting (2018) studying tree skinks (Egernia striolata);
Boogert, Monceau, and Lefebvre (2010) studying Zenaida
doves (Zenaida aurita); Logan (2016b) studying great-tailed
grackles (Quiscalus mexicanus); Gilbert-Norton, Shahan, and
Shivik (2009) studying the effect of Skinnerian schedules of
reinforcement on coyotes (Canis latrans); and Manrique and
Call (2015) studying how great ape learning changes with age.
This suggestion chimes with the popular view that a key fea-
ture of executive control in cognition is the capacity to inhibit
a prepotent behavior, which is obviously implicated in rever-
sal learning. A few authors have gone beyond that, and have
considered that a better measure of behavioral flexibility
would be the capacity for serial reversal learning, that is the
capacity to “learn the rules” of reversal learning so that suc-
cessive reversals are made more quickly. Examples include
Liu, Day, Summers, and Burmeister (2016) in a study of the
green and black poison dart frog Dendrobates auratus (they
refer to serial reversal learning as requiring “advanced” behav-
ioral flexibility); Bond, Kamil, and Balda (2007) in a
comparative study involving three species of corvid; and
Chow, Leaver, Wang and Lea (2015) studying Eastern gray
squirrels.
In recent years, however, there has been an increasing ten-
dency to use the term “behavioral flexibility” in particular
connection with animal problem solving. Although any situ-
ation requiring learning can be described as solving a prob-
lem, “problem solving” typically refers to the spontaneous
solution of physical problems, most often the extraction of
food from inaccessible places. The places concerned could
either be naturally occurring or experimentally contrived, but
experimental situations – puzzle boxes – are easier to study,
though theymay be deployed in natural situations as well as in
laboratories. Authors using the term “behavioral flexibility”
either as a synonym for problem-solving ability or in an at-
tempt to explain it, include Webster and Lefebvre (2001) in a
comparative study of several species of birds in Barbados;
Isden, Panayi, Dingle, and Madden (2013) studying spotted
bowerbirds (Ptilonorhynchus maculatus); Mangalam and
Singh (2013) examining urban bonnet macaques’ (Macaca
radiata) strategies for extracting food from anthropogenic
sources; Loukola, Perry, Coscos, and Chittka (2017) studying
bumblebees (Bombus terrestris); and Chow, Lurz, and Lea
(2018) comparing Eurasian red with Eastern gray squirrels
(Sciurus vulgaris and S. carolinensis). Griffin and Guez
(2014) reviewed the relation between experimental studies
of problem solving and the emergence of innovative behaviors
in the wild, invoking behavioral flexibility as a linking
mechanism.
Brain size, behavioral flexibility, and innovation
This tendency to identify behavioral flexibility with problem-
solving ability is seen most prominently in attempts to make
large-scale comparative assessments of cognitive differences
between taxa, and to relate them to possible causes and con-
sequences. The majority of these papers have come from
Lefebvre and his colleagues. They have used published anec-
dotal reports of novel foraging methods in birds as an index of
the species’ capacity for problem solving and hence of its
behavioral flexibility, and have then examined how this mea-
sure correlates with residual forebrain size. Residual forebrain
size is the excess of forebrain mass over what would be pre-
dicted from the correlation across a wide range of species
between brain and body mass (cf. Jerison, 1985). Lefebvre,
Whittle, Lascaris, and Finkelstein (1997) first demonstrated
such a correlation between innovation reports and residual
brain size across 17 different orders of birds, using data from
North America and the British Isles, and Lefebvre, Gaxiola,
Dawson, Timmermans, Rosza, and Kabai (1998) reported a
similar correlation across orders and parvorders of
Australasian birds. Similar correlations have been reported
in other taxa, for example across species in the mammalian
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orders Primates (Reader & Laland, 2002) and Carnivora
(Benson-Amram, Dantzer, Stricker, Swanson, & Holekamp,
2016). The basic analysis has also been refined. For example
by Nicolakakis and Lefebvre (2000) using an enlarged sample
of northern European birds, while Overington, Morand-
Ferron, Boogert, and Lefebvre (2009) showed that the variety
of innovations recorded was more important than the mere
number of innovations. There have also been attempts to re-
fine the areas of the brain responsible for the correlation: in
Reader and Laland’s analysis, they focused on neocortex size,
while Timmermans, Lefebvre, Boire, and Basu (2000)
returned to the dataset used by Lefebvre et al. (1997), and
showed that the key brain area in birds was the hyperstriatum.
Because of the reliability of this correlation, residual brain size
is sometimes used as a proxy for observed behavioral flexibil-
ity in comparative studies, as in the analysis carried through
by Sol, Szekely, Liker, and Lefebvre (2007).
The consequences of behavioral flexibility
There is a potential feedback relationship between behavioral
flexibility and brain size: The greater the adaptive advantages
of behavioral flexibility, the greater the selective pressure to
increase the size of the brain. However, within the life of an
individual organism, species brain size can reasonably be tak-
en as a precursor of behavioral flexibility, rather than a conse-
quence – although engaging in flexible behavior might cause
brain growth, and has been claimed to induce desirable chang-
es in brain activity (e.g., Belleville et al., 2011). But what
might the consequences of higher behavioral flexibility be?
Several surveys have suggested that, between taxa, higher
behavioral flexibility contributes to fitness. Nicolakakis, Sol,
and Lefebvre (2003) showed that, across the parvorders of
birds worldwide, those with higher recorded innovation rates
(hence, behavioral flexibility) tended to include more species,
suggesting that evolution (and in particular, speciation) is
speeded up in such taxonomic groups. Sol et al. (2007) ex-
tended this result by showing that, across both populations
and taxonomic families of birds, higher residual brain mass
is associated with lower adult mortality per year, even taking
into account factors such as body mass and social structure.
Within the parrots, Schuck-Paim, Alonso, and Ottoni (2008)
showed that those with greater residual brain size (implying
greater behavioral flexibility) tended to live in a wider range of
climate types. A more ambiguous result was found by Sol,
Lefebvre, and Rodriguez-Teijeiro (2005): They showed that
migratory species of passerine bird tended to have lower re-
sidual brain size than related non-migrant species. Sol et al.
interpret this result as implying that sedentary species have to
rely on innovative feeding techniques to cope with winter
conditions in the temperate zone, though it is not obvious
why a change of seasons would impose more demands on
foraging technique than a change of continents.
All these studies compare averages for species or higher
taxonomic groups with one another. Within species, evidence
that behavioral flexibility is correlated with fitness has been
harder to find, regardless of how behavioral flexibility is
measured. Within species, not all evidence supports the idea
that flexibility enhances fitness: In their studies of spotted
bowerbirds, Isden et al. (2013) used a battery of six cognitive
tests including reversal learning, but could not derive any
measure that would predict breeding success. Huebner,
Fichtel, and Kappeler (2018) found a similar result in gray
mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus). And Madden,
Langley, Whiteside, Beardsworth, and Van Horik (2018)
found that speed of reversal learning in pheasant chicks
(Phasianus colchicus) was negatively correlated with their
survival as adults.
There is one particular context, however, in which many
authors have associated greater success with higher behavioral
flexibility, and that is in adaptation to anthropogenic environ-
mental change and in particular to urbanization. The spread of
urban development commonly results in a great loss of bio-
logical diversity in the wildlife of an area, but this may be
accompanied by an increase in wildlife biomass; a few species
do very well in the urban environment (e.g., Chace & Walsh,
2006). This may be due to dominance of resources by a few
invasive species (Shochat et al., 2010). Both success in the
urban environment and success in novel environments gener-
ally, and hence invasion success, have been repeatedly linked
with behavioral flexibility (e.g., Griffin & Diquelou, 2015, for
the case of the invasive Indian myna in Australia). There is an
obvious logical link, in that to succeed in any new environ-
ment, and in particular in the urban environment, an animal
has to be able to vary its behavior, but there is also substantial
empirical evidence of a link, as demonstrated in the reviews
by Sih (2013), Lowry, Lill, and Wong (2013) and Barrett,
Stanton, and Benson-Amram (2019).
So what does behavioral flexibility mean?
We have seen that across the past half-century “behavioral
flexibility” has been used to mean everything from an absence
of instinctual predetermination of behavior, through to relative
performance under quite specific kinds of cognitive challenge.
There is no simple historical progression between these dif-
ferent meanings, but the trend is towards using “behavioral
flexibility” more specifically where learning or problem solv-
ing are demonstrably involved, with the term “phenotypic
flexibility” being used where adaptive variation has an un-
known origin, and might be due in part to genetic differences
between individuals and populations.
Unsurprisingly, these different definitions do not cohere,
empirically speaking. There are manipulations that leave
problem solving unimpaired but damage learning of the rever-
sal of the same problem (e.g., early social deprivation in rats;
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M. J. Morgan, 1973). Within species individual differences in
simple associative learning speed are not reliably correlated
with speed of solving more complex problems (e.g., in great-
tailed grackles; Logan 2016a). Where a number of different
cognitive tests are given to the same animals, correlations
between their performance levels tend to be low (e.g., Isden
et al., 2013). Specifically, the two capacities that have been
most often associated with behavioral flexibility, reversal
learning and innovative problem solving, do not necessarily
correlate across individuals, as for example in the study of
common mynas (Sturnus tristis) in Australia by Griffin,
Guez, Lermite, and Patience (2013).
Inevitably, these conceptual and empirical inconsistences
have resulted in some confusion (Audet & Lefebvre, 2017).
One possible response would be to advise against using the
term “behavioral flexibility” at all. However, we want to argue
for a different approach: to give it a more precise meaning.
The remainder of this paper explores how that might be done.
A model of problem-solving incorporating
flexibility
We present here a simple formal model of problem-solving,
which includes a parameter to represent behavioral flexibility.
Our model therefore focuses on behavioral flexibility in the
sense of changes of behavior within an individual, rather than
variations in behavior that can be attributed to stable differ-
ences between individuals, perhaps of genetic origin. On the
other hand, the model is open to the possibility that the flex-
ibility parameter is itself a stable difference between individ-
uals, which might account for stable individual differences in
problem-solving performance – where they exist (see
Cauchoix et al., 2018).
Inevitably, such a model will not be a full representation of
problem solving, and no parameter of any model will capture
everything that has been meant by flexibility in the past. On
the other hand, by constructing such a formal model, we force
ourselves to be explicit about the roles that behavioral flexi-
bility can play, and what is (and what is not) covered by our
own emerging definition. We can also hope to make some
counterintuitive or simply unexpected predictions about the
effects of behavioral flexibility, predictions that could be test-
ed in future experiments.
The situation to be modeled
The puzzle situation that inspired this model has been used in
a series of experiments on problem-solving in squirrels
(Chow, Lea, & Leaver 2016; Chow et al., 2017; Chow,
Lurz, & Lea 2018; Chow et al., 2019). The basic design is
fully described by Chow et al. (2016), though later experi-
ments involved some variations. It consists of a transparent,
roughly cubical box supported on short legs above a solid
pyramidal base. Slotted across the box are several levers, each
bearing a container, which may (or may not) contain a nut.
The squirrel’s task is to dislodge the levers that contain nuts;
the nut will then fall to the base, and roll out of the apparatus
so the squirrel can reach it. Figure 1a is a simplified diagram of
the apparatus, with only a single lever represented. An impor-
tant feature of the puzzle is that the nut container is at one end
of the lever, and blocks the movement of the lever out of the
box. Figure 1b shows four possible responses the squirrel
might make to the lever: pulling it or pushing it, from either
the end nearer the nut container (“near end”), or the end fur-
ther from the nut container (“far end”). Of course, there are
other possible responses as well.
This situation incorporates a number of features that we
believe need to be included in any model of problem solving:
There are multiple possible responses that an animal can
make.
Some responses are effective in solving the puzzle and thus
securing the reward, others are not. Note, however, that the
situation does not include any element of “shaping,” in which
responses that are not fully effective are rewarded early in the
animal’s exposure to the situation in order to encourage the
emergence of more effective responses.
Some of the possible responses are more likely to be made
than others when the animal first encounters the apparatus:
they have a higher “operant level,” in the terms used by the
early Skinnerians (e.g., Schoenfeld, Antonitis, & Bersh,
1950).
Independent of their operant level, with a given reward (in
this case food), some responses will be learned more quickly
than others: in the terms used by Seligman (1970), they have a
higher level of preparedness.
Basic principles of the model and their
implementation
The key principle of our model is that not all learning is nec-
essarily revealed in performance. The learning/performance
distinction is one of the oldest ideas in animal learning theory,
but historically it was invoked to account for the effects of
motivational shifts. Here we use it to accommodate the effects
of response competition: the fact that an animal has some
tendency to emit several different responses, but only one of
them can be emitted at any given moment. Accordingly, we
draw a distinction between response probability, which is
what we can actually observe, and response strength, an un-
derlying, unobserved quantity that determines response prob-
ability in conjunction with the strengths of other, competing,
responses. Because response strength is seen as an internal
analog of response probability, we specify that it must have
probability-like properties: all response strengths must lie be-
tween 0 and 1 (but never reach either of these limits), and at all
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times the sum of all response strengths is constant and equal to
1. Crucially, reward and non-reward are modeled as acting on
response strengths, not directly on response probabilities.
To implement these principles, we need to specify the
learning rule, to describe how response strengths are changed
by reward and non-reward, and a response selection rule, to
describe how a particular response is chosen given the
strengths of all available responses. In our model, prepared-
ness is modeled as a parameter of the learning rule, while
flexibility, our topic of primary interest, is modeled as a pa-
rameter of the response selection rule. Thus, our model is
implementing a hypothesis that behavioral flexibility is a mat-
ter of response selection rather than learning, though of course
learning is still concerned indirectly, since it is learning that
determines response strength. We note in passing that our
hypothesis that flexibility is concernedwith response selection
opens the door to a possible distinction between behavioral
and cognitive flexibility, a topic we have not broached in the
present paper.
The learning rule The choice of a particular learning rule is not
crucial to our modeling, and we suspect that many different
rules would give similar results. In the simulations that follow,
we have used a simple linear rule:
Let si(t) be the strength of the ith response at time t
Then whenever the ith response is emitted, si(t) is changed
to si(t+1) where
si t þ 1ð Þ ¼ 1þ aið Þsi tð Þ if the response was rewarded ð1aÞ
si t þ 1ð Þ ¼ 1−bið Þsi tð Þ if the response was not rewarded
ð1bÞ
Following these calculations, the si values are renormalized
so that ∑si = 1. This has the consequence that, if the ith re-
sponse is rewarded, the strengths of all other responses fall,
while if ith response is emitted but not rewarded, the strengths
of all other responses rise. Note that the application of these
equations, and the subsequent normalization, will never result
in an s value reaching 0 or 1.
The values ai and bi are response-specific parameters
(though for simplicity they can be set equal across all re-
sponses). ai represents the preparedness of response i: the
higher ai, the easier it is to learn that response (for the given
Fig. 1 (a) Simplified diagram (not to scale) of the apparatus used by Chow et al. (2016). In practice there were ten levers, five of which were baited with
nuts and five were unbaited. (b) Four possible responses a squirrel could make in an attempt to retrieve a nut
Learn Behav
problem and reward type). Conversely, bi represents the ease
of extinction of response i. For any response, the relation
between these two parameters is of particular significance: if
ai > bi, response i is resistant to extinction or perseverative –
more is learned when it is successful than when it fails. The
high resistance to extinction that can be seen after even a
single reinforcement of a response (see, e.g., Skinner, 1938,
Fig. 15) suggests that if this learning rule is to be used, b
values might need to be set lower than corresponding a values.
The response-selection rule The heart of our model is the
response-selection rule. Formally, we can say that the proba-
bility of the ith response, pi, is determined by a transformation
function fu
pi ¼ f u sið Þ ð2Þ
where u is a parameter, intended to capture variations in be-
havioral flexibility; how it might do that is explored below.
First, however, we need to specify some essential properties of
the function f. From first principles, we can state: that f should
be uniformly increasing in s, so that increasing response
strength always results in increasing response probability; that
as s approaches 0, p should correspondingly approach 0, so
that a response that has negligible strength has a negligible
chance of occurring; and that that as s approaches 1, p should
correspondingly approach 1, so that a response that is the only
one with any non-negligible strength is virtually certain to
occur. Figure 2a shows one function that has these properties.
It is certainly not the only candidate, but it is a convenient
example. It is most easily described by a pair of equations:
β ¼ N−1 1−si; 0; 1ð Þ ð3aÞ
pi ¼ 1−N β; u; 1ð Þ ð3bÞ
where N(x,m,σ) is the integral from 0 to x of the normal dis-
tribution with mean m and standard deviation σ, and
N-1(y,m,σ) is its inverse. This function is familiar as the receiv-
er operating characteristic (ROC) used in the simplest form of
psychophysical signal detection theory (Tanner & Swets,
1954), but our present use of it has no connection with signal
detection. It is important to note that, because the si values are
normalized so that they sum to one, it will also be necessary to
normalize the pi values following the application of Eq. 3, so
that the property required of all probabilities, that ∑pi = 1, is
preserved.
The purpose of the parameter u is to represent behavioral
flexibility, by changing the way in which response strengths
are transformed into response probabilities. Figure 2b shows
how the function f changes as a result of changes in u. With a
zero value for u, we have a neutral situation, in which response
strengths determine response probabilities directly, without
transformation. With positive values of u, p values increase
more rapidly than s values when s is low, and more slowly
when s is high. This will lead to rapid initial learning follow-
ing early rewards, but slower convergence on a single solu-
tion. Negative values of u lead to the converse case, where
p values increase less rapidly than s values when s is low, and
more rapidly when s is high. This should lead to more explor-
atory responding in the early stages of learning, but more rapid
convergence once one response acquires dominant strength.
Curiously, it is not immediately obvious which of these cases
corresponds to greater behavioral flexibility, or would bemore
adaptive. We therefore postpone further interpretation of the
parameter u until we have reported the results of simulations
in which it is varied.
Testing the model by simulation
Having defined the model, we then proceeded to test it by
simulation. The simulation code was written in Pascal within
the Embarcadero Delphi system, version XE2. The complete
Fig. 2 (a) The function used in the simulations to transform response
strength, the quantity acted on by reward and non-reward, into response
probability. The function is defined by Equation 3. (b) The effect of
varying the parameter u in the function
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source code, and an executable file for the Windows 64-bit
operating system, are available in an open repository at https://
osf.io/uqdn3/.
Initial simulations
We first tested the model’s properties by simulating a highly
artificial situation. In these simulations, we set initial values
and parameters as follows:
The repertoire size (the total number of responses consid-
ered) was set to 10. We gave all responses the same initial
operant level, so all si values were initially set to 0.1; it follows
that all pi values also started at 0.1. There was no differential
preparedness, so all ai values were set to a constant value, a, of
0.1. Learning and extinction were regarded as symmetrical, so
all bi values were also set to 0.1. Only a single response was
effective at any one time. In this and all our subsequent tests,
we simulated the performance of the model by using random
number generation to select a response according to the cur-
rent set of pi values.
We carried out 1,000 simulations of problem solving with
these parameters and initial values, continuing training until
the successful response was made nine times in ten successive
responses; use of this criterion means that, regardless of the
response strengths, the probability of the correct response
should have reached about the same value, 0.9, in all situa-
tions. Once this criterion had been reached, we then changed
which response was effective, but without changing the si
values, so the simulated subject was faced with a shift or
reversal situation.
Table 1 shows the results of these simulations, with three
different values of u (-1, 0 and 1). It can be seen that changing
the parameter u had a marked effect on the course of learning.
With negative u, criterion was reached faster, both in initial
learning and in reversal, but the correct response did not ac-
quire such dominant strength. This will presumably have con-
tributed to the more rapid learning of the shift. It is notable
that, even after criterion has been reached on the shifted cor-
rect response, the initially correct response still has somewhat
greater strength than the responses that were never rewarded.
We confirmed that these trends were general by simulating
with several other positive and negative values of u.
On the basis of these results, we might suggest that nega-
tive u corresponds to greater behavioral flexibility, since it
leads to more rapid learning both initially and following a
change in reward contingencies. However, we wanted to test
the model in a somewhat more realistic situation, making use
of the parametric flexibility we had built into it.
Simulations of an idealized version of the Chow et al.
(2016) task
Accordingly, we selected parameters that plausibly described
the problem-solving task used by Chow et al. (2016, 2017,
2018, 2019) involving the apparatus shown in Fig. 1. We used
a slightly idealized version of the task, based on how we
initially expected squirrels to respond to it, rather than on the
way they actually responded, because that allowed us to pit
the effects of operant level and preparedness against each
other, whereas in practice Chow et al. (2016) found the same
responses were favored by both operant level and prepared-
ness. The initial values and parameters we used were as fol-
lows. In the light of the initial simulations reported above, we
set repertoire size at 8, since that seemed sufficient to show the
effects of experience on non-rewarded responses. We focused
on four of these responses, to correspond to the Push Near,
Pull Near, Push Far, and Pull Far responses shown in Fig. 1.
By the design of the apparatus, only Push Near and Pull Far
would be effective. However, we assumed that the two Pull
responses would have higher operant levels than the two Push
responses, since they involved moving the nut towards the
squirrel rather than away from it. Finally, we assumed that
Near responses would be more prepared than Far responses,
since Far responses require a detour, and it has been known at
least since Köhler (1925, chapter 1) that problem solutions
involving detour are generally slow to emerge.
Our assumptions do not fully correspond to what Chow
et al. (2016) observed. As we expected, they did indeed
Table 1 Mean results of 1,000 simulations, in which each of ten
responses was assigned the same operant level and preparedness. There
was a single effective response in each phase of the simulation, and the
model was trained until this response was made as nine out of ten
successive responses. In the reversal phase, the effective response was
changed, and the simulation started with the response strengths reached at
the end of acquisition. Response strengths for the effective response at
each phase are shown in bold
Phase of simulation u Mean responses to criterion Response strengths (s values) at criterion
Acquisition (effective response no. 1) -1 66.0 .638, .046, .046, .045, .042, .042, .048, .046, .046, .041
0 95.3 .818, .023, .027, .023, .022, .029, .029, .027, .022, .029
1 167.4 .978, .006, .005, .001, .008, .008, .003, .007, .005, .004
Reversal (effective response no. 2) -1 85.6 .061, .622, .047, .032, .032, .034, .046, .039, .041, .035
0 130.3 .032, .821, .015, .019, .018, .012, .015, .016, .013, .018
1 193.3 .007, .976, .005, .007, .004, .003, .003, .001, .007, .005
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observe that Pull responses were learned less readily than
Push responses. However, they also found that their operant
levels were lower than those of Push responses, contrary to
what we expected. Accordingly, we cannot be sure that the
rapid learning of Push was due to lower preparedness. There is
no interest in simulating a situation where both operant level
and preparedness favor the same responses, since in that case
the effects of the two factors cannot be disentangled. It is in
this sense that we are simulating an idealized version of the
Chow et al. experiment.
In the light of these considerations we set initial values and
parameters as follows:
Push Near: initial s = 0.05 (low operant level), a = 0.2
(high preparedness)
Push Far: initial s = 0.05 (low operant level), a = 0.05
(low preparedness)
Pull Near: initial s = 0.2 (high operant level), a = 0.2 (high
preparedness)
Pull Far: initial s = 0.2 (high operant level), a = 0.05 (low
preparedness)
The remaining four responses were given neutral values of
s and a, 0.1 in both cases. Recognizing that symmetry between
acquisition and extinction is unrealistic, we set all b values to
half the corresponding a values.
Following the procedure used by Chow et al. (2016), we
simulated training up to the point of 60 successful responses.
Relative success at learning was therefore measured by the
total number of responses emitted before this criterion was
reached. We varied the parameter u in the same way as in
the initial simulations reported above, and ran 10,000 simula-
tions with each u value.
Table 2 shows the results of these simulations. As in the
initial simulations, negative u values led to faster learning, in
that fewer total responses were made in the course of making
60 effective responses. However, this was not the only effect
of varying u. With u set to -1, the simulations almost always
locked onto the Pull Far response (high operant level, low
preparedness). But with u set to +1, they most often locked
on to the alternative effective response, Push Near, with low
operant level but high preparedness. With the neutral value of
u, response probabilities to the two effective responses were
intermediate, with both occurring with substantial probability.
These intermediate mean values for response strengths and
probabilities are ambiguous, in that an intermediate value
could arise in twoways. It could be that the final s and p values
are indeed intermediate, or it could be that they are always
take extreme values, close to zero or one, but that sometimes
they go to one extreme and sometimes to the other. To distin-
guish these two possibilities, we examined the results of indi-
vidual simulations. Figure 3 shows histograms of final s and
p values for the two effective responses, for the three different
values of u tested.
The histograms shown in Fig. 3 confirm that, with u set to -
1, the simulation almost always locks on to the Pull Far re-
sponse. With u set to zero, it tends to lock on to one of the
effective responses or the other, though it is unpredictable
which will be preferred, and there is a modest frequency of
cases where both occur. With u of 1, the majority tendency is
for the simulation to lock onto the Push Near response, but
there is a higher frequency of mixed outcomes; and the final
response probabilities are strikingly less extreme than the final
response strengths.
Conclusions from the simulations
Does our parameter u capture behavioral flexibility, as we
hoped? We argue that it does, up to a point, with negative u
corresponding to higher behavioral flexibility than positive u.
In all situations we have tested, negative u leads to faster
learning; and when we set operant level against preparedness,
in simulating the experiments of Chow et al. (2016), a nega-
tive u value enabled what was learned to be controlled by
operant level (which would be a commonsense expectation
in any situation) rather than being captured by preparedness.
In both these senses, therefore, negative u is associated with
freedom from instinctual constraints – and as we saw in the
Table 2 Mean results of 10,000 simulations of an idealized version of
the problem used by Chow et al. (2016). The first four responses for
which data are shown in the right-hand columns correspond to the Push
Near, Push Far, Pull Near, and Pull Far responses shown in Fig. 1b; these
responses differed in operant level (Pull higher than Push) and prepared-
ness (Near higher than Far). The remaining four responses had equal,
intermediate levels of these quantities. Response strengths and probabil-
ities for the effective response at each phase are shown in bold
u Mean responses to 60 successes Mean response strengths after 60 successes Response probabilities calculated
from final mean response strengths
-1 83.3 .035, .012, .025, .847,
.024, .026, .028, .027
.004, .003, .006, .988,
.005, .003, .009, .001
0 103.9 .315, .012, .014, .595,
.017, .018, .014, .019
.318, .013, .012, .595,
.011, .016, .013, .012
1 130.5 .805, .002, .003, .154,
.006, .003, .001, .007
.521, .028, .039, .266,
.034, .036, .033, .037
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first part of the present paper, that was the original meaning of
behavioral flexibility, and still perhaps represents its core
meaning. Of course, operant levels might themselves result
from the animal’s instinctual repertoire, but they need not: so
far as our model is concerned, they are simply the outcome of
the response strengths with which the animal approaches the
situation, and these will be the result of all its previous expe-
rience as well as any innate tendencies.
A further way in which negative u values can be seen to
represent greater behavioral flexibility can be seen by ref-
erence to Table 1. In our simple, initial simulations, we
trained to a stringent criterion (9 effective responses out
of 10), and this required a high probability of emitting
the effective response. With positive or zero u, the
resulting response strengths were also close to one, mean-
ing that all other responses had very little strength. But
with negative u, the strength of the preferred response
was not entirely dominant, meaning that when the situation
changes, the simulation is able to change its behavior more
quickly. This point emphasizes the significance of the key
assumption in all our simulations, that not everything that
is learned is immediately expressed in behavior. It may
well be that it is an animal’s currently unexpressed learning
that enables it to behave flexibly.
Fig. 3 Histograms of final response strengths and probabilities obtained
in the simulations of an idealized version of the experiment of Chow et al.
(2016). Note that for the case of u = 0, response probabilities are identical
to response strengths. Note also that a different vertical scale is used in the
case of u = -1
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However, u clearly does not capture everything that has
been meant by behavioral flexibility. In particular, we have
not found that manipulating u can dissociate learning speeds
in situations that have been thought to require different de-
grees of flexibility, for example reversal learning compared
with initial learning.
As Audet and Lefebvre (2017) have pointed out, the dif-
ferent ways in which different authors have used the term
“behavioral flexibility,” and the different ways in which they
have sought to measure it, can only lead to conceptual confu-
sion. Ultimately it is an empirical matter which of the behav-
ioral traits that might be thought to represent flexibility will
turn out to be correlated across individuals. However, theoret-
ical analysis and simulation can help by demonstrating that
single points of variation, such as manipulation of our param-
eter u, may have multiple effects all of which are plausible
signs of flexibility – but, as in our results, may fail to produce
other effects that have also been thought to be such signs.
Limitations of the model
The present model is, of course, not a complete representation
of the kinds of learning that can take place in problem-solving
situations. Three well-known phenomena, in particular, are
not represented within it:
1) Inhibitory learning. In our model, reward increases re-
sponse strength, and non-reward decreases it. Although
the rates at which these processes can be made to differ
(by making our a and b parameters unequal), there is no
representation of history. But we have known since the
work of Pavlov (1927, Lecture IV) that extinguishing a
response does not return it to the state before it was ever
rewarded. Although our model does separate response
probability from the underlying response strength, it is
not clear that it could ever predict phenomena such as
spontaneous recovery; to do that one would have to in-
troduce separate values for excitatory and inhibitory re-
sponse strength, as Pavlov did. That would be possible
within our model, but it would introduce substantial extra
complexity, which might make it difficult to get clear and
consistent results from simulations.
2) Perseveration. In Thorndike’s (1913) initial formulation
of the laws of learning, he included a Law of Exercise,
which simply stated that, regardless of reward, the more
often a response had occurred, the more often it is likely
to occur in the future. Although Thorndike diluted this
law in his later formulations (e.g., Thorndike, 1940), it
remains true that animals are commonly observed to per-
severate on responses even when there is no reward for
doing so (e.g., M.J. Morgan, 1974), and our model does
not allow for any such tendency – though it might be
possible to do so with a relatively minor modification.
3) Generalization. The basis of shaping, whether it occurs
accidentally as in Lloyd Morgan’s (C.L. Morgan, 1894,
pp. 291-294) observations of problem solving in his dog
Tony, or deliberately as noted by Skinner (1938, pp. 339-
340) and much standard laboratory practice that has
followed from his work, is that rewarding one response
will make some other responses more likely. Such re-
sponse generalization could be included in our model,
though it would bring an unwelcome increase in the num-
ber of parameters to be specified: a matrix of generaliza-
tion coefficients linking each response to all others would
be required.
Although all of these processes are basic to animal learning
and problem solving, and we could certainly add others to
them, we believe that none of them is inherent to the concept
of behavioral flexibility; so it is unlikely that a more complex
model that included these processes would produce very dif-
ferent results from those we have already seen.
General conclusions
Both from our historical exploration of the literature that has
used the term “behavioral flexibility” and from our attempts to
represent it within a formal model of problem solving, a core
meaning for this protean term emerges. It refers to a quality or
trait that frees an animal from the constraints of instinct, and
allows it to adapt efficiently to variation in the environment.
Such a trait might lead to variations between populations of a
species that are faced with different environmental demands; it
may also lead to different individuals finding different solu-
tions to problems that all members of their species face. We
have not here considered flexibility as a personality dimen-
sion, but it seems highly likely that it will vary between indi-
viduals within a species, just as it self-evidently varies be-
tween species.
That core meaning, however, is not sufficient to specify in
all cases whether a given usage of the term “behavioral flex-
ibility” is appropriate or not. Only empirical work will deter-
minewhether all tendencies that fit that broad definition in fact
co-vary, either between or within species; and only theoretical
work will determine whether tendencies that do co-vary can
be attributed to variations in a single property or mechanism.
The present simulations have shown that some, but not all, of
the effects that have been ascribed to variations in behavioral
flexibility can be modeled by manipulating a single parameter
in a simple model of problem solving. We believe that this is a
promising direction of research, and could usefully be
extended.
We do not suppose that the function we have proposed to
relate response probabilities to response strengths has any
physical reality in any animal’s brain. What it does is express
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an idea: the recognition that what an animal does, at any point
in time, does not completely reflect what it has learned – what
it knows, if you will. In its most abstract form, therefore, what
we are arguing is that the key to behavioral flexibility lies in
the knowledge that an animal has, beyond what it is currently
expressing in its behavior. It is not unreasonable to suppose
that the wider and deeper that knowledge, the better equipped
the animal will be to cope with new situations; in a word, the
better it will be able to show flexibility.
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